Professur für Algorithmen und Komplexität
New Paper in Mathematics of Operations Research 08 Sep 2021
In our paper ''Algorithms for Persuasion with Limited Communication'' (by Ronen Gradwohl, Niklas Hahn, Martin Hoefer, Rann Smorodinsky) we study the problem faced by a recommendation engine (e.g., a website for hotel booking or travel) that wants to persuade a user with a recommendation. We analyze restrictions on the signal space such that there are more potential actions by the user than signals that can be issued for recommendation. For symmetric instances, when a priori all actions have similar profits, we characterize and design efficient algorithms for optimal recommendation schemes for the engine. In a subclass of instances, where profits are independent among actions, we obtain an algorithm that computes a near-optimal scheme. The paper has been accepted for publication in Mathematics of Operations Research, a leading journal in operations research.
Tutorial on Algorithms and Information Design at SAGT 2021 27 Aug 2021
New Paper at SAGT 2021 29 Jun 2021
Our paper ''When Dividing Mixed Manna is Easier than Dividing Goods: Competitive Equilibria with a Constant Number of Chores'' (by Jugal Garg, Martin Hoefer, Peter McGlaughlin, Marco Schmalhofer) was accepted at the 14th Int. Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT 2021).
New Paper at IJCAI 2021 29 Apr 2021
Our paper ''Stochastic Probing with Increasing Precision'' (by Martin Hoefer, Kevin Schewior, Daniel Schmand) was accepted at the 30th Int. Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI 2021), one of the two international top-conferences in artificial intelligence.
New Paper in American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 17 Mar 2021
In our paper ''Reaping the Informational Surplus in Bayesian Persuasion'' (by Ronen Gradwohl, Niklas Hahn, Martin Hoefer, Rann Smorodinsky) we study a competitive scenario, in which several experts with knowledge about the state of the world want to influence the choice of a decision maker (e.g., consultants/lobbyists try to influence policy decisions of the government). Even if there is only slight uncertainty for each expert about the interests of other experts, then the decision maker can extract the full informational surplus -- by restricting to listen only to one expert, the emerging competition motivates them to reveal all information about the state of the world. The paper has been accepted for publication in American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, a top-journal in economics.