Optimization and Uncertainty

Summer term 2021

Prof. Dr. Martin Hoefer Tim Koglin, Lisa Wilhelmi

Assignment 2

Exercise 2.1 Independent probabilities

A (not necessarily fair) coin shows heads with probability p and tails with probability 1-p at each toss. Assume the coin is tossed two times in a row. Determine all values $p \in [0, 1]$ for which the two following events are independent.

- A: Both tosses yield the same outcome.
- B: The second toss yields heads.

Exercise 2.2 Greedy Matching

Consider a graph G = (V, E). Every edge $e \in E$ has a value $v_e \geq 0$. A matching is a set of edges $M \subseteq E$ where any node $u \in V$ is incident to not more than one edge in M, i.e., $|\{e \in M, u \in e\}| \leq 1$. The value of M is defined by $v(M) = \sum_{e \in M} v_e$.

Let M^* be a matching with maximum value. The *GreedyAlgo* starts with $M_g = \emptyset$ and iterates over all edges consecutively in non-ascending order of their values. An edge is added to M_q if M_q is still a matching thereafter. Show that the resulting greedy matching M_q satisfies

 $v(M_g) \ge \frac{1}{2} \cdot v(M^*) \,.$

Exercise 2.3 SECRETARY MATCHING with approximation

Let *GreedyAlgo* be defined as in the previous exercise and recall that it computes a 2-approximation for the offline weighted MATCHING problem. Consider a variation of the algorithm for SECRETARY MATCHING (algorithm 2) discussed in the lecture where line 8 is replaced by applying *GreedyAlgo* to compute a matching $M^{g,t}$ of $G_t = (L_t \cup R, E_t)$ in each round $t \ge s+1$.

- a) Show that Lemma 1 takes the following form given the modification described above: For every given round t = s + 1, ..., n, we have $\mathbb{E}[v(e_t)] \ge v(M^*)/(2 \cdot n)$.
- b) Show that there is a $2 \cdot (e + o(1))$ -competitive algorithm for SECRETARY MATCHING. *Hint*: You can use the result from subtask a). What about Lemma 2?

Commentary: This proof can be extended to arbitrary deterministic α -approximation algorithms for offline weighted MATCHING, where $\alpha > 1$. In this way, one obtains an $\alpha \cdot (e + o(1))$ -competitive algorithm for Secretary Matching.

Contacts for submissions and questions: {koglin,wilhelmi}@em.uni-frankfurt.de.



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(6 points)

(5+5 points)

(4 points)

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